UNITED NATIONS **S**

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S/1999/285
16 March 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 MARCH 1999 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to enclose a copy of the letter from the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission, Richard Butler, to the President of the Security Council, dated 11 March 1999.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and of its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) A. Peter BURLEIGH
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

99-07281 (E) 160399

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Annex

Letter dated 11 March 1999 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council

By letter of 28 February 1999, the Permanent Representative of Iraq transmitted to the Secretary-General a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq. These communications were circulated as a document of the Security Council (S/1999/219).

In both the above letters, reference is made to the spread of foot and mouth disease among Iraqi livestock, and it is said that this results from a shortage of vaccine, "particularly since work in the laboratory that was producing the vaccine was halted when the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) destroyed all its equipment." This does not accord with the facts.

I believe it is important to provide you, and through you the members of the Security Council, with the pertinent facts in this case. These are given in the annex to this letter. I have already provided the same information on this issue to the Secretary-General.

I would be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Richard BUTLER

Enclosure

Production of foot and mouth disease vaccine in Iraq

In 1982, a facility was installed by a foreign company at Daura, in Iraq, intended to produce 12 million doses per year of foot and mouth disease vaccine. According to Iraq, the best production level ever achieved was between 1 and 2 million doses per year. This plant was declared by Iraq to the Special Commission in November 1991 as a civilian facility for the production of vaccines. Following on the Commission's own inspections, analyses and investigations, Iraq admitted, in July 1995, that Daura was not a purely civilian facility, but had been used for biological warfare agent production, research and development.

According to the 1995 disclosure, the facility was taken over in 1990 by Iraq's Technical Research Centre for the biological warfare programme. In Iraq's own declarations, it is stated that large-scale production of the biological warfare agent botulinum toxin took place at this facility, using some of the equipment procured for foot and mouth disease vaccine production. Research was also undertaken on viral agents for Iraq's biological warfare programme, including camelpox, enterovirus 70 and rotavirus. Iraq further declared that a genetic engineering research and development programme was initiated for biological warfare purposes at the facility.

As a result of modifications introduced by Iraq to the facility for the production of biological weapons, foot and mouth disease vaccine was no longer produced. Production of this vaccine was briefly resumed in 1992, following a reconfiguration of the facility after the Gulf war, as part of Iraq's attempt to conceal its biological warfare programme. After September 1992, Iraq discontinued all production of vaccine, although staff and equipment remained at the site. Thereafter, through the good offices of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Iraq imported foot and mouth disease vaccine, as it had done previously.

After Iraq's eventual admission, in 1995, that it had had an extensive biological warfare programme, the Commission, in accordance with Security Council resolution 687 (1991), proceeded to supervise the destruction of installations, facilities and equipment which had been used in that proscribed programme. Accordingly, in 1996, 28 pieces of equipment at Daura, which had been identified by Iraq as used for biological warfare production, were removed from the facility and destroyed by Iraq under the Commission's supervision, and special air-handling equipment at the facility was disabled. Some 40 major pieces, originally imported for the production of foot and mouth disease vaccine, remained, as their use in the biological warfare programme had not been established.

Taking into account the above-mentioned facts, it is thus false to state that the production of foot and mouth disease vaccine was halted when the Commission destroyed all the equipment at Daura. Production of the vaccine was halted unilaterally by Iraq in September 1992. Furthermore, not all the equipment at the facility was destroyed by UNSCOM in 1996.

Foot and mouth disease vaccine is on the list of items subject to the Commission's export/import monitoring system and thus its import should be reported to the Commission. However, the Commission's mechanism in this respect is purely one of notification and imposes no impediment on import.

11 March 1999

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-third session
Agenda item 59
QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION ON
AND INCREASE IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL AND RELATED MATTERS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-fourth year

Identical letters dated 15 March 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

The method known as the Arria Formula is associated with the name of the representative of Venezuela on the Security Council during my country's most recent term as a non-permanent member of the Council. That compels us to make the comments contained in this letter as a contribution to the discussion that is now taking place, both in the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation On and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council, and in the Council itself.

The contemporary conflicts that constitute threats to international peace and security are increasingly displaying their non-traditional nature, as are the actors involved.

During Venezuela's presidency in 1992, the Security Council deemed it appropriate and necessary to obtain direct assessments from individuals, organizations or institutions that could, because of their responsibilities or personal or institutional influence, contribute to a better understanding of the situation under consideration.

Given the non-governmental status of such actors, or the fact that they were not even States Members of the Organization, the Council believed that such contacts should be informal and should take place outside the Council Chamber, thus respecting the rights and duties of the Member State or States involved.

It is worth recalling in this context that, while nothing prevented the Presidency of the Council or its members from establishing informal contacts or exchanges of this nature with the parties to a conflict from the standpoint of their national interests or the interests of groups of countries (the five permanent members, the Group of Non-Aligned Countries, and so on), it was not the practice of the Council as a whole to engage in such exchanges.

Consequently, these informal consultation exercises enabled the Council as a whole to obtain direct information and assessments concerning the dominant perceptions at a given moment on the part of those who directly or indirectly influenced the course of a conflict resolution process. In this way, the principle of collective responsibility of the Council was emphasized and the transparency of informal consultations was enhanced, as was the process of reconciling approaches among its members. Accordingly, these consultations demonstrated their usefulness without undermining the responsibility of the Council or that of the Secretary-General and his special representatives.

The Arria Formula constitutes, in our view, a treasury of Security Council procedures - the product of experience and of a pragmatic vision of its responsibilities.

This informal mechanism should be used, as it has been up to now, at the discretion of the President of the Security Council and with the authorization of its members. Nevertheless, the Arria Formula should be used in accordance with its original concept and should not be invoked in order to receive representatives of countries which are full Members of the United Nations, as that would be contrary to the principle of sovereign equality of States set out in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 59, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ignacio ARCAYA
Ambassador

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S/1999/287
17 March 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 MARCH 1999 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 1174 (1998) of 15 June 1998, by which the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) was extended for a period terminating on 21 June 1999.

As you are aware, Richard Monk (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) has been serving as Commissioner of the UNMIBH International Police Task Force (IPTF) since 2 March 1998. Mr. Monk, who has performed his duties with exemplary professionalism and dedication during a critical period in the United Nations involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has informed me of his intention to return to the service of his Government at the end of his tour of duty. To succeed him, it is my intention to appoint Colonel Detlef Buwitt (Germany) as Commissioner of IPTF. The Government of Germany has informed me that Colonel Buwitt will be promoted to Brigadier General upon his appointment to this post.

I should be grateful if you could bring the above to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

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S/1999/288
17 March 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 MARCH 1999 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 12 March 1999 (S/1999/287) concerning your intention to appoint Colonel Detlef Buwitt of Germany as Commissioner of the International Police Task Force (IPTF) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention contained in your letter.

(Signed) QIN Huasun
President of the Security Council

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17 March 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 MARCH 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SUDAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Please find, enclosed herewith, excerpts from an interview by Fox News channel with George Stephanopoulos, former White House Presidential Aide (see annex).

Mr. Stephanopoulos stated that the United States military strike against Al-Shifa Pharmaceutical Factory in Khartoum has been part of a Clinton administration "Wag the Dog" scenario. He added that "the President did what his military advisers advised. But there is this tendency in the White House to present the President with the decision you know he wants to make. So I think that at some level the way the decision was presented could have been affected by the political crisis."

Mr. Stephanopoulos also indicated that in the case of the controversial bombing of the Sudan pharmaceutical plant, a military error is more likely to have occurred than a political one. "I think in retrospect it has turned out to be a mistake of some sort," he said. "Maybe an intelligence error. I don't think it was badly motivated."

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Elfatih ERWA
Permanent Representative

Annex

Stephanopoulos Says U.S. Bombing of Sudan Could Have Been a 'Wag the Dog'

12.14 p.m. ET (1714 GMT) March 15, 1999

By Patrick Riley

<FN_ARTICLENEW YORK— Last year's military attacks in Sudan and Afghanistan may have been part of a Clinton administration "Wag the Dog" scenario, former presidential aide George Stephanopoulos says.

Stephanopoulos, who left the White House after the 1996 campaign, says that if the commander-in-chief did not act out of political motivations, hoping to sway the public's attention from the scandal, it may have been because he didn't have to — his advisers had already taken this into account.

"I think there is something subtle at work at times of crisis in the White House," he said. "I think the president did what his military advisers advised. But there is this tendency in the White House to present the president with the decision you know he wants to make. So I think that at some level the way the decision was presented could've been affected by the political crisis."

Stephanopoulos, promoting his new memoir *All Too Human*, made the comments in an interview with Fox News Channel's Catherine Crier, which airs Monday night on the *Crier Report* (10 p.m. EST).

In the 1997 movie *Wag The Dog*, a president creates a fake war to divert public attention from a sex scandal. When the United States bombed Sudan and Afghanistan on August 20, 1998, many speculated that life was imitating art.
While the bombings officially came in retaliation for the terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, they occurred the same day the nation was focused on Monica Lewinsky, who was testifying before the Starr grand jury, and just days after Clinton admitted an inappropriate relationship with her.

Stephanopoulos said in the case of the controversial bombing of the Sudan pharmaceutical plant, a military error is more likely to have occurred than a political one. "I think in retrospect it has turned out to be a mistake of some sort," he said. "Maybe an intelligence error. I don't think it was badly motivated."

During the Stephanopoulos's time in the White House, he says the president never seemed to be abusing his powers. "Whenever the president was preparing to order military force I always thought he was doing it for the right reasons," he says.

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LETTER DATED 17 MARCH 1999 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 8 March 1999, which I have received from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

Annex

Letter dated 8 March 1999 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with Security Council resolution 1088 (1996), I attach the monthly report on operations of the Stabilization Force. I would appreciate your making this report available to the Security Council.

(Signed) Javier SOLANA

Enclosure

Monthly report to the Security Council on the operations of the Stabilization Force

1. Over the reporting period (20 January to 20 February 1999) there were approximately 31,500 troops deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, with contributions from all the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations and from 20 non-NATO countries.

2. The Stabilization Force (SFOR) continued to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance by means of ground and air patrols, with combat aircraft flying approximately 139 hours.

3. SFOR continues to monitor entity compliance with Security Council resolution 1160 (1998), which prohibits the transport of weapons into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, by inspecting Government-owned factories and weapon storage sites and by monitoring crossing points on the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. To date, no violations of Security Council resolution 1160 (1998) have been reported.

Cooperation and compliance by the parties

4. Over the reporting period, the parties remained substantially compliant with most military aspects of the Peace Agreement, and the situation in-theatre was relatively calm.

5. Over the reporting period, SFOR troops conducted a total of 329 weapon storage site inspections: 85 Bosniac; 65 Bosnian Croat; 135 Bosnian Serb; and 44 Federation. No major discrepancies were reported. To date, the Entity Armed Forces have closed 80 per cent (113 of 141) of those sites required to be closed or consolidated between 10 June 1998 and 28 February 1999.

6. SFOR monitored 537 training and movement activities: 75 Bosniac; 10 Bosnian Croat; 274 Bosnian Serb; and 178 Federation. Training and movement bans were imposed on the 11th Signal Battalion of the 1st Bosnian Serb Army Corps from 4 to 25 January 1999, and on the 302nd Armoured Brigade of the 3rd Bosnian Serb Army Corps because of non-compliance with regard to their training on the Manjaca Range. In addition, the Republika Srpska Police Anti-Terrorist Brigade remains under the movement and training ban imposed in August 1997.

7. SFOR troops continued to support the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) by providing security for the latter's inspection of local police stations and in monitoring possible restrictions on freedom of movement. In this regard, on 23 January, SFOR troops monitored the removal of a roadblock which had been set up by Croatian police on the road leading to Licka Kaldrma, near the disputed border area of Martin Brod.

8. SFOR troops also supported IPTF in conducting two prison inspections, in Zenica and Tuzla (Multi-National Division North), at the beginning of February. The inspection of the Zenica prison resulted in the confiscation and subsequent

destruction by SFOR of 114 rifles and 94 pistols, which were being held in excess of authorized limits.

9. Entity Armed Forces demining teams continued to conduct counter-mine support operations, which included training, equipment maintenance, reduction in field fortifications and landmine stockpiles and other related activities. On 15 February, despite the adverse weather conditions, seven demining teams started mine-clearance operations.

Cooperation with international organizations

10. Within its capabilities and in accordance with its mandate, SFOR continues to provide assistance to the international institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including IPTF, the Office of the High Representative, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

11. SFOR continues to provide support to the Office of the High Representative in its efforts to open airfields and to expand civil air operations. In this regard, SFOR issued a "letter of exception" permitting the overnight parking of aircraft at Mostar airport, thereby increasing the potential number of flights available.

12. SFOR also continues to play an active role in supporting the Office of the High Representative's efforts to establish joint institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. One such key institution, the Standing Committee on Military Matters, met twice during the period, on 2 and 18 February. The first meeting resulted in an agreement on procedures governing the composition of a State-level delegation from Bosnia and Herzegovina to the article V arms control talks in Vienna. The second meeting of the Standing Committee on Military Matters, which was a special session, was held on 18 February and was attended by the NATO Secretary-General and by the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Addressing the Committee, the Secretary-General encouraged the parties to take concrete steps to fulfil their obligations under the terms of the Peace Agreement and of the Madrid Peace Implementation Council Declaration of December 1998.

Outlook

13. Isolated acts of intimidation and violence are likely to continue as a result of the return of refugees and displaced persons. The forthcoming announcements on the arbitration decision on Brcko is also likely to present potential security challenges.